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CASE COMMENTS

Conflict of Laws--Full Faith and Credit for Foreign
Custody Judgments
P and D, a married couple with three children, were separated
in 1959. P,the wife, moved to Virginia. The children remained in
North Carolina with D. Two days later P took the children from
North Carolina to Virginia. The following day D filed a petition
in the Virginia courts for a writ of habeas corpus directing P to
produce the children before the court and that the care, custody
and possession of the children be awarded to D. During the pendency of this proceeding P and D reached an agreement whereby D
was given custody of the children with P to have custody during
certain specified periods. Upon consummation of this agreement
a "consent dismissal" was had of the habeas corpus proceeding
instituted by D. In 1960, P commenced an action in the South
Carolina courts seeking custody of the children, then residing in
South Carolina with D. The lower court awarded custody of the
children to P, granting D visitation rights. D appealed on the
grounds that, inter alia, the courts of South Carolina must recognize, in accordance with the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution, the agreed order of dismissal of the
Virginia court. Held, reversed. The "consent dismissal" order of
the Virginia court constituted a judgment on the merits barring
subsequent action for the same cause by the same parties. Such
an order was res judicata where rendered and accordingly was
entitled to full faith and credit. Ford v. Ford, 124 S.E.2d 33 (N.C.
1961).
This case presents an interesting problem which has grown in
importance with the increasing mobility and rising divorce rate of
the American people. It is basically a question of which is the
higher principle: the doctrine of res judicata as applied through
the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution
or the theory of the state as parens patriae in its relationship to
children.
Article IV, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States
provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every
other State." The general theory of this clause is to prevent dissatisfied litigants from relitigating in one state issues that have
[427]
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been duly litigated in another. Thus, this clause was designed to
promote a major policy of the law: that there be finality and certainty and an end to litigation. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604
(1958).
But where courts are confronted with determining the proper
custody of a child, the regard for curbing litigation is subordinated
to the welfare of the child. Gaunt v. Gaunt, 160 Okla. Crim. 195,
16 P.2d 579 (1932). This is the area of the conflict.
The court decisions on the application of the full faith and
credit clause to child custody decrees have been as varied as
human facts and needs due to the difficulty inherent in any attempt to apply hard and fast rules of res judicata and conflict of
laws to the problems of child custody. Several general rules, admittedly uncertain, have been developed, however, that do serve
as a guide in this area.
While a minority of courts apparently refuse full faith and
credit to custody awards, Bachman v. Mefias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136
N.E.2d 866 (1956), the weight of authority appears to be that in
the absence of fraud or want of jurisdiction a decree awarding
custody of a child must be given full faith and credit in other
states as to the right to custody of a child at the time and under
the circmnstances of its rendition. Kniepkamp v. Richards, 192
Ga. App. 509, 16 S.E.2d 24 (1941); see generally Annot., 160
A.L.R. 400 (1946).
A court seeking to relitigate a custody judgment must, therefore, consider whether the foreign court had proper jurisdiction.
The determination by the courts as to what is proper jurisdiction
in this area is dominated by one of three theories. The first is that
the court is acting on behalf of the child as parens patriae. According to this view mere residence of the child is sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction to determine the proper custody of the
child. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). Another theory is that a custody award affects the status of the
child-a permanent relationship, the jurisdiction over which is
in the court of the state of the child's domicile, and in that court
only. Beckman v. Beckman, 358 Mo. App. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566
(1949). A third theory maintains that jurisdiction over a child's
custody is based on in personam jurisdiction over the child's parents. This theory emphasizes the parent-child relationship rather
than the state-child relationship. Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W. Va.
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124, 81 S.E. 706 (1914). Thus when the award sought to be enforced is not based on the jurisdictional standard recognized by
the forum court, the award is generally disregarded, purportedly
on the theory that full faith and credit is not mandatory.
If it is determined that the foreign court does have jurisdiction,
the court must then consider whether there has been such a change
in circumstances since the rendition of the foreign judgment as to
render its modification desirable for the welfare of the child. Note,
25 Fordham L. Rev. 744 (1957). Custody decrees by their very
nature are not made final in the sense that they cannot be modified. Therefore, such a decree has no effect in another state where
there has been such a change in circumstances subsequent to the
foreign decree as to render its modification desirable for the
welfare of the child. Cook v. Cook, 135 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Stapler v. Leamons, 101 W. Va. 235, 132 S.E. 507 (1926). While
this limitation as to change in circumstances is considered essential
for the protection of the child it has the disadvantage of enabling
any court to reach the desired result either by finding or denying
a change of circumstances. As the Connecticut court has stated,
"..

. a finding of changed circumstances is one easily made when

a court is so inclined." So it is questionable whether the recognition given to foreign custody judgments is of more than theoretical
consequence. Morrill v. Morill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Ati. 1 (1910).
The problem in the principal case which sets it apart from the
great mass of litigation in this area was the consideration of whether an agreed order of dismissal under the Virginia practice put
an end to the suit pending before it and operated as a bar to a
subsequent suit on the same cause of action between the same
parties. A majority of the court found, basing their decision on
Bardach Iron & Steel Co. v. Tenenbaum, 136 Va. 163, 118 S.E.
502 (1923), that an agreed order of dismissal is equivalent to a
judgment of retraxit and bars a subsequent suit on the same
cause by the same parties as fully as a retraxit. West Virginia
would apparently agree with the majority on this point. Pethel
v. McCullough, 49 W. Va. 520, 39 S.E. 199 (1901).
Having found that an agreed order of dismissal does operate
as a bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action between
the same parties, the South Carolina court decided that there had
not been a sufficient change in circumstances subsequent to the
Virginia decree as to render its modification desirable by the
South Carolina court. Justice Oxner, in a dissent, disagreed with
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this principle when applied to a proceeding relating to the custody
of children. He declared that the contract entered into by the
parents in Virginia should not preclude the South Carolina courts
from determining the question of custody. He maintained that
the contractual rights of the parents should be subordinated to
the welfare of the children.
There is much that can be said for Justice Oxner's dissent, not
only on the proposition that an agreed order of dismissal should
not bar a subsequent suit on the same cause of action by the same
parties but that any custody decree by a foreign court should be
subject to inquiry by a court of competent jurisdiction. The primary principle in this field should be the discretion of the court
as exclusively governed by the child's welfare.
On the other hand, there are arguments that support the proposition that custody decrees should be subject to the full faith and
credit clause. If parental "child snatching" and constant litigation
for the possession of a child are the results of nonrecognition of
foreign custody decrees, the best interests of the child are defeated.
One writer has proposed a "clean hands" approach to the problem. This theory suggests that only if the party seeking to relitigate
the question of the child's custody comes before the court in good
faith without fault with respect to the child, should such relitigation be allowed. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody
Decrees, 51 MicH. L. REv. 345 (1953).
Whatever the best view, the welfare of the child cannot be
promoted if its custody is controlled by uncertain rules as to
constitutional questions and is so easily subject to change under
them.
Forest Jackson Bowman

Criminal Law-Shoplifting-Lack of Requirement of Intent

Does Not Invalidate Statute
D was found guilty of a misdemeanor offense under the North
Carolina shoplifting statute. On appeal, D moved that the warrant be quashed on the ground that the statute does not require
any felonious intent, and is therefore unconstitutional. The court
allowed this motion to quash. Held, reversed. The shoplifting
statute is not violative of state or federal constitutions although
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